The Busi-Xabi tandem and high blood pressure, holy and tactical signal

A detailed tactical analysis of the world champion Spain in South Africa 2010 presents us on stage, ahead of any other tactical, technical and physical contingency, the image of a powerful team, self-confident, who always knew what he wanted and how. to get it. Including the teachings of the first match against Switzerland in which the defeat could have caused irreparable damage. It was not, precisely, because of that confidence and that job that the hard core of players demonstrated. They learned to win in the first person after watching so many years lose their fellow predecessors.

Without systematically entering the always thorny terrain of the comparison between who was stronger, or played better, if the Red that had won the Eurocopa two years before with Luis Aragonés, or the World Cup of Vicente del Bosque, the reality that the numbers indicate is that between the starting eleven of Vienna and that of Johannesburg there were five differences. Half of the field players.

DIFFERENT HALF TEAM

Changes in all lines except the goal. In defense: Piqué for Marchena; in the center Busquets by Senna and Xabi Alonso by Cesc; above, Villa for Torres and Pedro for Silva. Half a team and consequently five footballers with different individual characteristics, although the two blocks had a connection, the style: the commitment to being protagonists in matches. For having the ball and taking the initiative.

Later, on the field of play, each team interpreted it in their own way with the evident influence imposed by the coach on duty. Two tactical issues especially identified each version, especially on the defensive side. High blood pressure after loss was considerably more pronounced in Del Bosque's Spain, while Luis Roja's red felt more comfortable in the middle withdrawal and the exit to the counterattack.

The second unappealable disparity was that Aragonés entrusted to a single man, Marcos Senna, the vital role of midfielder in its two facets: defensive and offensive, the first being more accentuated and, in South Africa, his replacement achieved what seemed impossible: that Busquets and Xabi Alonso will function as one man. With a double task in Toulouse: left-handed inside with the ball and second central midfielder when it was necessary to cover gaps.

GAME SYSTEM

Throughout the Championship, seven games, the National Team managed two game systems with a very similar occupation of spaces. In his 'fat book', Del Bosque prefers that his team be identified at 1-4-3-3 with Busquets as a pure midfielder and Xavi and Xabi as interiors. Although it confirms that in the defensive phase it was a 1-4-2-3-1. In the report that the wise technicians of the FIFA elaborate in each World Cup, Spain played a 1-4-2-3-1. For them Busquets and Xabi were two central midfielders.

SUBSTITUTIONS

With that positional starting point, each encounter was a story, especially on the offensive side. As soon as he played with an offensive reference and two men well open to the bands, he enhanced the interior game with men who started from the outside to play inside and looked for the game between the lines. Changes, both tactical and men's, were not usually planned in advance. Circumstances ruled and on many occasions they meant a definitive variant to change the direction of the parties. That was the other great success of the coach: hitting the substitutions at key moments.

ATTACK GAME

The offensive game flow did not materialize on the scoreboard: only eight goals. Very few for the arrivals on goal and the executed auctions. He did not exceed two goals per game (Honduras and Chile) and won the last four games by the minimum (1-0). In all the matches he plays with at least one offensive reference and in four games Villa and Torres coincide in the starting eleven. The false '9' never appears.

In the offensive transition, the team incorporated both sides to the midfield, Sergio always one step ahead of Capdevila. Busquets got into the middle to help out the ball. Numerical and positional superiority was always sought in the midfield with four men on the inside and the sides on the outside. That's where you tried to make a difference. The general bet was the organized attack with the ball as a reference. Only occasionally did he run counter. When he saw the situation very clearly and had little risk. He rarely used direct play.

On set pieces, the offensive actions were not exactly a specialty of the house, but a Puyol header from the corner gave the pass to the final. It was one of the few direct corners that Xavi threw. The preference was to take them out of habit in short to create play and move the opponent with a second action from the center. Also many lateral and frontal fouls were shorted out to players who came to receive.

DEFENSIVE PLAY

The idea was to stand at 1-4-2-3-1, which sometimes became 1-4-1-4-1 because one of the two midfielders jumped on the opponent who was carrying the ball or trying to occupy a space free because some companion had been out of orbit. The attack-defense transition was almost exemplary. The first intention was to finish the more plays the better to avoid against the rival. At the time of pressing to retrieve the ball the slogan was to do it as high as possible and the farther from his area the better. The reason was clear: many men attacked and in the loss there were always elements close to the ball.

At the time of the regrouping, the line of four tried to be halfway between the front of their area and the dividing line, in middle position. At that time the block had to be made as short as possible.

In the stopped ball actions all mechanized. In corners, combined. Four men in the zone. Two near the post closest to the launch, Xavi and Xabi and two to the rebound: Iniesta and another; five marks to man; and a footballer off the top, usually Villa. In the lateral fouls, he tried to get the defense as far as possible from the front of his area with six elements in line and two ahead. The area was free for the goalkeeper to leave.

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Spain-Switzerland

Spain starts in its classic 1-4-3-3. At the time of the game, with the changes of Torres for Busquets and Navas for Silva, he went to 1-4-1-3-2. With Pedro's entry by Iniesta, the team plays with two wide open ends (Navas and Pedro) with two center forwards (Torres and Villa) and Xavi as playmaker. Not for those. The riskiest bet, eight men in the rival field and the centrals in the division, does not reach the goal. (All graphics show the final tactical arrangement)

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Spain-Honduras

Two changes in eleven. Navas and Torres for Iniesta and Silva. 1-4-3-3 is maintained with different profiles. Navas and Villa wide open with reference towers. The position of the Asturian and his diagonals does a lot of damage to the rival. Sergio takes advantage of the breadth of Navas to join the '8' lane instead of outside. Another variant. The team charges the attack game from the right to finish on the left.

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Spain-Chile

Iniesta by Navas. Bid for the inside game and between the lines to break the persecutions of the man from Bielsa. The duel breaks when Andrés breaks free from the gang and rampages from all sides. With the advantage on the scoreboard, one more midfielder enters: Cesc for Torres and looks for a physical addition with Javi Martínez ahead of the centrals. Busquets ends as a right-back theoretician with Sergio Ramos ahead, as interior. Strange final placement.

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Spain-Portugal

The 1-4-3-3 is not touched, but the occupation of the spaces has its nuances. Sergio plays further ahead with the entire right (blind) sideline for him. In the center, ahead of Busquets, a triangle with Xabi, Iniesta and Xavi. Above, Ram towers and Villa on the left. A very staggered eleven. The best game in Spain until then.

Del Bosque surprises his own technical team with the entry of Llorente – he had not played a minute – for Torres. Turn to 1-4-1-4-1. Villa continues to the left. To avoid final risks, he ends up looking for Busquets among the centrals: five behind. Xavi has to overcome an individual brand of Pepe.

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Spain-Paraguay

The exit surprise lasts ten minutes: Torres pulled to the right. Misleading strategy: Torres-Villa-Iniesta. Hateful party. Two positional changes and readjustments. Cesc's entry shows a drawing with three lines of three and a reference above. Capdevila is more central left-handed than lateral. Sergio, embedded in the second line at the height of Busquets and Xabi. The change of Pedro by Xabi, had a yellow, offers a twist and shows a 1-3-2-2-3. The staggered occupation of the spaces is reflected in four positional lines. It ends with three forwards.

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Spain-Germany

“Vicentazo”. Pedro start from the left. Surprise letter. Extreme with freedom of movement, like Iniesta in the other band. Busquets more focused than other parties. Xavi emerges as organizer despite Schweinsteiger's marking. He takes off the shadow of the German taking refuge behind the line of the ball. Three measured changes: Running towers; Silva to have and Marchena, next to Busi, to contain. Maximum performance in both facets: offensive and defensive. And a laboratory goal that is worth a final.

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Spain-Holland

What works is not touched. There will be time for it. Pedro repeats. Busquets closes spaces near the centrals. The sides are lowered to occupy the space left by Pedro and Iniesta with their diagonals. The entrance to Navas seeks amplitude on one of the two bands; Cesc's more round trip: Torres's one action like Vienna's two years earlier.

In the extension Iniesta breaks free from all ties and emerges wherever he wants. His zone of influence is infinite, as much as to score from the opposite band to his. A luxury. Andrés becomes the owner of the situation. With ball and without ball. Everyone is looking for him. The long action that ends in both goals is a true reflection of the collective game, moving the ball from side to side.

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